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Abstrak 
 
Menggunakan data intraday, penelitian ini menemukan bukti adanya perilaku bias pada 
harga di Bursa Efek Jakarta. Investor yang mengalami kerugian pada pagi hari lebih berani 
menerima risiko pada siang hari. Investor yang mengalami kerugian di pagi hari bersedia membeli 
pada harga lebih tinggi daripada investor yang memperoleh keuntungan di pagi hari. 
Kebalikannya, investor yang tidak suka menerima risiko sepanjang hari akan mengambil posisi 
sebaliknya, yaitu hanya mau menerima lebih sedikit risiko jika investor telah menerima 
keuntungan sebelumnya. Penemuan ini membuktikan adanya pengaruh psikologi investor dalam 
hubungannya dengan keuntungan, kerugian, dan risiko.  
 
Kata kunci: keuangan perilaku, keuntungan pagi hari, kerugian pagi hari, penentuan risiko 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
“Financial economists have been aware for a long time that in laboratory settings, humans 
often make systematic mistakes and choices that cannot be explained by traditional models of 
choice under uncertainty,” says Paul Pfleiderer, the William F. Sharpe Professor of Financial 
Economics and co-director of the Business School’s Financial Management Program. Until 
recently, most researchers believed these mistakes or deviations from rationality did not have a 
significant impact on pricing in the financial markets. Now many of us are willing to entertain the 
notion that some of behavioral phenomena uncovered in laboratory settings may affect pricing in 
financial markets (News Release of the Stanford Business School, 2001). The question is: Which 
behaviors? And more important: How do they affect pricing?  
The good news is that behavioral finance is at the heart of what finance is all about, and 
that is: What drives stock prices? What drives investors’ decision making? As noted by Campbell 
(2000), “Behavioral models cannot be tested using aggregate consumption or the market portfolio 
because rational utility-maximizing investors neither consumer aggregate consumption (some is 
accounted for by nonstandard investors) nor hold the market portfolio (instead they shift in and out 
of the stock market).” 
Theoretical research suggests that arbitrage by rational traders need not eliminate 
mispricing (Daniel et al., 2001). One reason is that there are some psychological biases which 
virtually no one escapes. A second reason is that when traders are risk-averse, prices reflect a 
weighted average of beliefs. Just as rational investors trade arbitrage away mispricing, irrational 
investors trade to arbitrage away rational pricing. The presumption that rational beliefs will be 
victorious is based on the premise that wealth must flow from foolish to wise investors. However, if 
investors are foolish aggressive in their trading, they may earn higher rewards for bearing more 
risk (see, e.g., DeLong et al., 1990b, 1991) or for exploiting information signals more aggressively 
(Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001), and may gain from intimidating competing informed traders (Kyle and 
Wang, 1997). In fact, when investors evaluate stocks, they often search for diagnostic information 
on the stock return. A natural consequence of this search for diagnostic information is exposure to 
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obviously irrelevant information—information that consumers perceive as clearly uninformative 
about the desired return. Irrelevant information may dilute investors’ beliefs through ability to 
deliver the desired return. Yet, studies on social judgment have demonstrated that adding 
obviously irrelevant information to diagnostic information may lead to less extreme judgments (see 
among others, De Dreu et al., 1995; Fein and Hilton, 1992; and Nisbett et al., 1981). Investors 
care about changes in financial wealth rather than absolute value, and that they are more 
sensitive to losses than to gains relative to certain reference points.  
Statman is an expert in the behavior known as the “fear of regret” says that people tend to 
feel sorrow and grief after having made an error in judgment. Investors deciding whether to sell a 
security are typically emotionally affected by whether the security was bought for more or less 
than the current price. Investors avoid selling stocks that have gone down in order to avoid the 
pain and regret of having made a bad investment.    
In this paper, focus of the study based on biases in trading behavior of market makers in 
the stock at the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX).  Any impact their trading biases have on prices is 
likely to be more pronounced and therefore easier to detect. The trading day is split into two 
periods and test whether traders with profitable morning increase or reduce their afternoon risk-
taking. Traders who experience morning losses more likely to take risk for afternoon prices, as 
losing traders are prepared to purchase at higher prices and sell at lower prices than those traders 
whose got morning gains. Conversely, if traders are averse to losses incurred at the daily horizon, 
this will lead to the opposite result: traders will take fewer risks as they become profitable. To see 
whether the traders’ loss aversion has an impact on prices, I examine whether the traders are 
more likely to move afternoon prices following morning losses. The traders are “price-setting” if 
they purchase at a higher price or sell at a lower price than prevailed previously. My result clearly 
demonstrates that traders are more likely to place such price-moving traders following morning 
losses. A trader who loses money in the morning is more likely to execute such a trade than a 
trader who makes money in the morning.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section I is introduction to behavior of investors. 
Section II reviews the stock market psychology and pricing intersect as theoretical background. 
Section III proposes data and method and the evidence of investor biases that affect asset prices 
are described by section IV. Section V is concluding remarks. 
 
2. STOCK MARKET PSYCHOLOGY AND PRICING INTERSECT 
Much of economic and financial theory is based on the notion that individuals act rationally 
and consider all available information in the decision-making process. Despite strong evidence 
that securities markets are highly efficient, there have been documented historical phenomena in 
securities markets that contradict the efficient market hypothesis and cannot be captured plausibly 
in models based on perfect investor rationality. Such phenomena are often referred to as stock 
market anomalies. More generally, there is an implicit view of the world that capital markets are 
destined to march steadily to nearly perfect market efficiency as smart investors pick off detected 
anomalies one by one (Daniel et al., 2001).  
Most of the standard assumptions underlying investment forecasting and portfolio 
management are wrong. They fail to take into account the emotional and psychological biases of 
those practicing the investment arts. Fear, greed, risk-seeking and aversion, and peer group 
pressure all play a role in the underperformance of many investment managers relative to their 
objectives. In fact, dozen of examples of irrational behavior and repeated errors in judgment have 
been documented in academic studies. Peter L Bernstein in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) states 
“reveals repeated patterns of irrationality, inconsistency, and incompetence in the ways human 
beings arrive at decisions and choices when faced with uncertainty.” Kahnemen and Tversky 
(1979) found that contrary to expected utility theory, people placed different weights on gains and 
losses and on different ranges of probability. They found that individuals are much more 
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distressed by prospective losses than they are happy by equivalent gains. Some economists have 
concluded that investors typically consider the loss of $1 dollar twice as painful as the pleasure 
received from a $1 gain. Loosing $100 is priceless than winning $100. They also found that 
individuals will respond differently to equivalent situations depending on whether it is presented in 
the context of losses or gains. People are willing to take more risks to avoid losses than to realize 
gains. Faced with sure gain, most investors are risk-averse, but faced with sure loss, investors 
become risk-takers. 
Traders always interpret the signals that they received. As they trade, JSX market makers 
interpret a variety of private signals related to the pit order flow. At any given point in time, they 
closely monitor brokers currently placing orders, including their identities, the size and direction of 
their orders, the eagerness with which they attempt to execute their orders, etc. How profitably 
market makers trade in response to these signals, by adjusting their quotes and managing their 
positions, depends on both their interpretation of the signals and on luck. To the extent that the 
signal quality is unknown, and varies across trading days, traders will update their assessment of 
the signal precision as market movements confirm or disconfirm their reading of the signals. If 
traders have biased self-attribution, a trader that places profitable trades will become 
overconfident in their order flow signals. The trader will overly attribute the profits of his/her trades 
to his/her interpretation of the order flow signals and insufficiently attribute the profits to luck. If 
signal quality varies significantly from day-to-day, traders with self-attribution bias that trade 
profitably in the morning will become overconfident and will assume above average afternoon risk 
“That affects how we fell toward future risk-taking. In particular, we may be less afraid of stock 
market risk after having accumulated a lot of prior gains—even if there is a small drop in the stock 
market, we will still be ahead overall”(Huang et al., 2001) . 
Gilovich et al., (1985) document that basketball players believe they are far more likely to 
score following previous successful attempts than following previous misses. They further 
demonstrate that these beliefs are not justified by their subsequent rate of success. If JSX market 
makers become similarly overconfident in their trading ability following successful mornings, they 
will assume addition afternoon risk. Moreover, if such a relationship exists, there will be little 
relation between morning and afternoon trading performance (Daniel et al., 2001). 
Thaler and Johnson (1990), also predicts a positive relation between morning profits and 
afternoon risk-taking. Investigating in an experimental setting the relation between prior outcomes 
and risk choice, they demonstrate that individuals are more risk-seeking following prior gains than 
following recent declines in wealth. This suggests that traders who have earned profits in the 
morning will become less risk-averse or morning trading profits will be positively related to 
afternoon risk-taking. Contrarily to Huang et al. (2001), Thaler and Johnson (1990), and Gilovitch 
et al. (1985), if traders are averse to losses at the daily horizon, then traders that lose money in 
the morning will respond by assuming greater risk in the afternoon (see, e.g., Daniel et al., 2001; 
Coval and Shumway, 2001; Camerer et al., 1997; and Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Based on both sides, Huang et al., 2001; Thaler and Johnson, 1990; and Gilovitch et al., 
1985, who belief that traders have earned profits in the morning will become less risk-averse, and 
on the another side, Daniel et al., 2001; Coval and Shumway, 2001; Camerer et al., 1997; and 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, who belief that traders with lose money in the morning will respond 
greater risk in the afternoon,  my study tests the null hypothesis of standard and rational investor 
behavior against overconfidence (or self-attribution bias) and loss-aversion traders. If traders are 
more willing to assume risk when gambling, they will take greater risks as their profits grow. 
Conversely, if traders are averse to losses incurred at the daily horizon, this will lead to opposite 
result: traders will take fewer risks as they become profitable. A trader who loses money in the 
morning, more likely to execute such a trade than a trader who makes money in the morning. 
Overall, while traders lose money in the morning, losing traders account for higher price of all 
afternoon price-setting trades places by market makers. 
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3. DATA AND METHOD 
  The intraday data was taken from six the most liquid stocks that have morning and 
afternoon trading, as follow: Telekomunikasi Indonesia (TLKM), Indosat (ISAT), Gudang Garam 
(GGRM), Astra International (ASII), Semen Gresik (SMGR), and H. M. Sampoerna (HMSP). The 
time horizon is October 1 through October 31, 2002. Even only one month observation, alot of 
data is examined in this research. 
To examine whether JSX traders exhibit loss aversion, the relation between morning 
trading performance and afternoon risk-taking are necessary be evaluated. Since trading day at 
JSX begins at 9:30 a.m. and ends at 4:00 p.m., I split the trading day into a morning period before 
11:59 a.m., and afternoon period after 1:30 p.m, after lunch break. Then, for each stock is 
calculated morning and afternoon returns, risks, volume, and number of trades. 
Following Coval and Shumway (2001) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), simple 
regression is used to estimate the relation between morning trading and afternoon risk-taking, with 
assumption, traders begin each day with zero inventory (exclude each trader’s absolute inventory). 
The adopted formula without inventory examines the relation between morning trading (morning 
gains and morning loss) and afternoon risk-taking as follow:   
 
π ia = α + βπ π im + βRRitm  + ε i  ...........................................................................   (1) 
  
Where: 
π ia  : return of stock i in the afternoon. 
 π im  : return of stock i in the morning. 
Ritm : total dollar risk of stock i in the morning 
α : constant 
β : estimated of regression coefficient 
ε i    : error term of stock i 
π ia  : return of stock i  the afternoon. 
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With the same concept, risk and volume can be investigated based on:  
Rita = α + βπ π im + βRRitm  + ε i ............................................................................. (2) 
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Where : 
Rita  : total dollar risk of stock i in the afternoon. 
π im : return of stock i in the morning. 
Ritm  : total dollar risk of stock i in the morning 
α : constant 
β : estimated of regression coefficient 
ε i    : error term of stock i 
 
Via =  α + βπ π im + βRRitm  + ε i  ..........................................................................  (3) 
Where: 
Via  : average trading volume of stock i  in the afternoon. 
π im : return of stock i  in the morning. 
Ritm : total dollar risk of stock i in the morning 
α : constant 
β   : estimated of regression coefficient 
ε i    : error term of stock i 
 
The relationship between trading volume and stock price volatility can be examined by 
Chan and Fong’s (1999) model.  
 
rit     = α + β Vit  + ε i t  ........................................................................................  (4) 
 
Where: 
  rit  : absolute return of stock i on minute t 
 :       Pitm – Pitm-1  
                   Pitm-1
Vit  : trading volume of stock i on minute t 
α : constant 
β : estimated of regression coefficient 
ε i tm   : error term of stock i on minute t 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL  RESULT 
Since my hypotheses related the risk that a trader will take to his/her profitability, it is 
important to measure both return and risk. To measure return (Table 1), I assume that each trader 
closes out his positions at the end of each day, and thus begins each day with no position. This 
assumption is supported by evidence of Kuserk and Locke (1993) and Manaster and Mann (1996) 
and has been used previously in Manaster and Mann (1996) and Coval and Shumway (2000, 
2001).  
Measuring the risk (Table 2) each trader takes is less straightforward. To measure the 
risk, a given position faces across the trading day, I employ an ordered logit regression (as in 
Coval and Shumway, 2000, 2001). A logit function of the probability of various potential absolute 
price changes over the next minute is regressed on the magnitude of price changes in the 
proceding five minutes and time-of-day dummy variables for each five-minute period during the 
trading day. The fitted values from this regression are then used to constract an expected absolute 
price change for each minute of each full trading day in October 2002. Since our risk measure is 
an expected absolute price change, it roughly corresponds to a one-standard deviation measure of 
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price change risk associated with each one-minute interval. Based on Table 2, by average, risk all 
transactions and morning loss outperforms than in the afternoon.. As general, risk increase after 
morning loss.  The standard deviation of their overall afternoon risk is significantly larger following 
losing mornings than following winning mornings. 
Beside stock price, traders’ belief can be viewed by stock volume (Table 3). Stock volume 
consists of number of transactions and trade size. Number of transaction or trading activity gives 
information more that moves prices than trade size (see among others, Sukmawati, 2002; 
Gopinath and Krisnamurti, 2000; Bessembinder et al., 1996; Jones et al., 1994; Harris and Raviv, 
1993; Shalen, 1993; and Easley and O’Hara, 1990). The presence of number of transactions 
variables has a reliably positive effect on stock price volatility. Table 4 describe the number of 
trade that shows how frequent the investors’ trading. Volume and number of trade all transaction 
and morning loss underperforms than in the afternoon. Afternoon volume  and number of trade are 
impacted by morning losses. Moreover, volume and number of transaction increase following 
losing morning.  The standard deviation of their overall afternoon volume and number of 
transaction are significantly larger following losing mornings than following winning mornings. 
To test the hypothesis simply by relating the risk a trader takes in the afternoon to the 
trader’s profit or loss in the morning. From Table 1 that traders with losing mornings are not 
otherwise equivalent to traders with profitable mornings. Looking at afternoon returns, we can see 
that they are only slightly lower following losing mornings than following profitable mornings. This 
suggests that the additional afternoon risk traders assume following losing mornings is not terribly 
costly from an expected return standpoint. Moreover, to the extent that traders seek to increase 
the spread in their afternoon returns following morning losses (e.g. due to loss aversion). The 
standard deviation of their overall afternoon return is significantly larger following losing mornings 
than following winning mornings. 
Table 5 describe regressions of afternoon risk-taking on morning profits. The regressions use 
average morning loss (Panel A), afternoon risks (Panel B), and trading volume (Panel C) and the regression of 
risk taking on morning losses shows on Table 6. As we see, consistent with the results presented in Table 1 
through 4, my regressions indicate that traders are loss-averse. I find strong evidence that our traders are 
highly loss-averse. Traders assume significantly more afternoon risk following morning losses than following 
morning gains. In their eagerness to assume greater afternoon risk, they place price-setting trades more 
frequently, purchasing stocks at higher prices, and selling stocks at lower prices. However, afternoon prices 
set by traders with morning losses reverse substantially more than those set by traders with morning gains. 
This suggests that any price impact resulting from the traders’ behavioral biases dissipates extremely quickly. 
Consistent with this, I find that mornings with widespread losses lead to increase in short-run afternoon 
volatility but no increase in volatility measured over longer intervals. These factors provide us with significant 
power to identify conditions under which behavior biases are likely to be important in influencing prices. 
Table 7 shows us the relationship between trading volume and the stock price volatility.  The price 
volatility is the standard deviation of price changes measured at one-second, one-minute, five-minute, ten-
minute, and half-day frequencies. To investigate the volatility, I regress normalized afternoon volatility on 
volatility in the corresponding morning and several measures of the prevalence of morning losses among 
traders. The afternoon price volatility is related to morning market maker profitability. Thus, although loss-
averse traders appear to have a short-term influence on prices, consistent with the result, their influence 
largely disappears during the ten minutes following their trades. However, it is important to note that while 
there appears to be a relationship between morning losses and afternoon volatility that is consistent with my 
earlier findings, the result are far from conclusive. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARK 
This paper review evidence about how psychological biases affect investor behavior and 
prices. I argue that a source of judgment and decision biases have any effect on prices. The 
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behavioral biases are important to detect the relationship between price-setting and risk-taking of 
traders.  
I find that behavioral biases among Jakarta Stock Exchange traders on prices have 
proven. Traders who experience morning losses more likely to take risk for afternoon prices, as 
losing traders are prepared to purchase at higher prices and sell at lower prices than those traders 
whose got morning gains. Conversely, if traders are averse to losses incurred at the daily horizon, 
this will lead to the opposite result: traders will take fewer risks as they become profitable. 
Meanwhile, there is positive evidence of trading volume to stock price volatility.  
To test the hypothesis simply by relating the risk a trader takes in the afternoon to the 
trader’s profit or loss in the morning. The traders with losing mornings are not otherwise 
equivalent to traders with profitable mornings. Looking at afternoon returns, we can see that they 
are only slightly lower following losing mornings than following profitable mornings. 
I find strong evidence that our traders are highly loss-averse. Traders assume significantly 
more afternoon risk following morning losses than following morning gains. In their eagerness to 
assume greater afternoon risk, they place price-setting trades more frequently, purchasing stocks 
at higher prices, and selling stocks at lower prices. People are willing to take more risks to avoid 
losses than to realize gains. Faced with sure gain, most investors are risk-averse, but faced with 
sure loss, investors become risk-takers. 
However, afternoon prices set by traders with morning losses reverse substantially more than those 
set by traders with morning gains. This suggests that any price impact resulting from the traders’ behavioral 
biases dissipates extremely quickly. Consistent with this, I find that mornings with widespread losses lead to 
increase in short-run afternoon volatility but no increase in volatility measured over longer intervals. These 
factors provide us with significant power to identify conditions under which behavior biases are likely to be 
important in influencing prices. 
Table 1 
Stock Return  (October 1- October 31, 2002) 
Stocks Morning Afternoon 
 Mean Standar Deviasi Mean Standar Deviasi 
All Transaction 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia -0.0000124 0.00233705 0.000002914 0.00193265 
Indosat -0.0000183 0.00223721 0.000003019 0.00168488 
Gudang Garam -0.0000642 0.00249478 0.000009618 0.00180391 
Astra International -0.0000152 0.00294502 0.0000007956 0.00279572 
Semen Gresik -0.000410 0.00740628 0.00007109 0.00294466 
H. M. Sampoerna -0.0000393 0.00281578 0.00001967 0.00226367 
Morning Gain 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 0.00005112 0.00219832 -0.000022 0.00184496 
Indosat 0.00006579 0.00196418 -0.00000565 0.00162371 
Gudang Garam 0.0001173 0.00184453 -0.0000639 0.00141578 
Astra International 0.00005330 0.00278840 -0.0000207 0.00274085 
Semen Gresik 0.0003226 0.00293280 -0.0001 0.00227247 
H. M. Sampoerna 0.00008269 0.00219366 -0.0000241 0.00242350 
Morning Loss 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia -0.0000543 0.0024233 0.00001434 0.0019715 
Indosat -0.0000933 0.00245312 0.00001043 0.0017357 
Gudang Garam -0.000151 0.00274824 0.00004669 0.00197024 
Astra International -0.000107 0.00314009 0.00002262 0.00285050 
Semen Gresik -0.00129 0.0104517 0.0002098 0.00339009 
H. M. Sampoerna -0.000138 0.00323158 0.00004531 0.00216448 
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By average, return all transactions and morning loss underperforms than in the afternoon. As 
general, the additional afternoon risk traders assume following losing mornings is not terribly 
costly from an expected return standpoint. Moreover, to the extent that traders seek to increase 
the spread in their afternoon returns following morning losses (e.g. due to loss aversion). The 
standard deviation of their overall afternoon return is significantly larger following losing mornings 
than following winning mornings. 
 
Table 2 
Stock Risk  (Oktober 1- Oktober 31, 2002) 
 
Stocks Morning Afternoon 
 Mean Standar Deviasi Mean Standar Deviasi 
All Transaction 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 0.001952 0.000865171 0.002008 0.000489613 
Indosat 0.002172 0.00111241 0.001569 0.000324118 
Gudang Garam 0.002094 0.00113601 0.001533 0.000625745 
Astra International 0.002641 0.000637326 0.002575 0.000717780 
Semen Gresik 0.008622 0.0142322 0.002821 0.00137884 
H. M. Sampoerna 0.002215 0.00120006 0.002110 0.000778257 
Morning Gain 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 0.001789 0.000462142 0.001832 0.000303472 
Indosat 0.001892 0.000637460 0.001576 0.000312359 
Gudang Garam 0.001822 0.000593154 0.001319 0.000380715 
Astra International 0.002582 0.000462587 0.002531 0.000659382 
Semen Gresik 0.003164 0.000711889 0.002173 0.000746381 
H. M. Sampoerna 0.002062 0.000636273 0.002282 0.00105091 
Morning Loss 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 0.002060 0.00106064 0.002125 0.000563876 
Indosat 0.002452 0.00142544 0.001562 0.000352280 
Gudang Garam 0.002241 0.00134202 0.001648 0.000711573 
Astra International 0.002751 0.00091462 0.002656 0.000866059 
Semen Gresik 0.01226 0.0177042 0.003253 0.00155584 
H. M. Sampoerna 0.002341 0.00154068 0.001970 0.000467902 
By average, risk all transactions and morning loss outperforms than in the afternoon.. As general, 
risk increase after morning loss.  The standard deviation of their overall afternoon risk is 
significantly larger following losing mornings than following winning mornings. 
 
Table 3 
Stock Volume (Oktober 1- Oktober 31, 2002) 
Stocks Morning Afternoon 
 Mean Standar Deviasi Mean Standar 
Deviasi 
All Transaction 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 28,758.96 62,268.08 29,266.61 71,133.67 
Indosat 5,878.42 9,498.71 6,246.24 10,068.05 
Gudang Garam 4,663.59 7,775.78 5,314.01 8,349.72 
Astra International 29,144.35 60,186.34 31,069.97 70,341.64 
Semen Gresik 2,552.75 2,702.14 3,073.02 3,608.01 
H. M. Sampoerna 18,717.47 58,994.42 22,537.12 42,349.66 
 34 
CO
PY
 FR
OM
 W
WW
.UA
JY.
AC
.ID
Morning Losses And Afternoon Price Volatility: Evidence of Jakarta Stock Exchange  
(Y. Sukmawati  Sukamulja) 
 
Morning Gain 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 29,781.05 67,941.92 26,568.58 60,193.45 
Indosat 6,283.55 10,570.61 6,466.71 10,319.26 
Gudang Garam 3,852.47 5,166.77 5,429.36 7,665.25 
Astra International 27,972.81 54,382.8 26,462.24 49,995.19 
Semen Gresik 2,312.32 2,119.95 3,007.09 3,036.84 
H. M. Sampoerna 17,478.04 31,066.22 19,860.13 39,346.99 
Morning Loss 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 28,85.85 58,224.89 30,501.62 75,586.64 
Indosat 5,517 8,413.31 6,057.8 9,846.22 
Gudang Garam 5,051.74 8,727.73 5,255.81 8,675.88 
Astra International 30,709.79 67,136.82 35,749.61 85,978.06 
Semen Gresik 2,841.75 3,247.95 3,126.44 4,015.26 
H. M. Sampoerna 19,725.07 74,323.82 24,107.12 43,946.48 
By average, volume all transactions and morning loss underperforms than in the afternoon. As 
general, afternoon volume is impacted by morning losses. Moreover, volume increase following 
losing morning.  The standard deviation of their overall afternoon volume is significantly larger 
following losing mornings than following winning mornings. 
 
Table 4 
 Number of Trade  (October 1- Oktober 31, 2002) 
Stocks Morning Afternoon 
 Mean Standar Deviasi Mean Standar Deviasi 
All Transaction 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 672.3 650.73 583.9 582.39 
Indosat 336.6 282.46 259.1 178.21 
Gudang Garam 184.3 134.92 148.8 123.69 
Astra International 578.8 503.29 452 473.8 
Semen Gresik 32.7 31.57 31.5 22.99 
H. M. Sampoerna 233.6 193.77 222.9 189.23 
Morning Gain 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 667.38 647.23 458.38 239.65 
Indosat 317.4 359.8 238.8 161.59 
Gudang Garam 170.43 128.95 142.57 63.16 
Astra International 509.31 425.36 350.38 251.74 
Semen Gresik 44.63 39.8 35.25 11.49 
H. M. Sampoerna 232.78 211.51 183.11 89.69 
Morning Loss 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 675.58 681.77 667.58 728.15 
Indosat 355.8 195.33 279.4 200.05 
Gudang Garam 191.77 142.61 152.15 148.98 
Astra International 707.86 640.59 640.71 721.25 
Semen Gresik 24.75 23.26 29 28.5 
H. M. Sampoerna 234.27 188.55 255.45 242.92 
In line to volume, number of trade all transactions and morning loss underperforms than in the 
afternoon. As general, afternoon number of trade is impacted by morning losses. Moreover, 
number of transaction increase following losing morning.  The standard deviation of their overall 
afternoon number of trade is significantly larger following losing mornings than following winning 
mornings. 
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Table 5 
 Morning Profits and Afternoon Risk-Taking  
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Morning Profits 
(Based on formula 1:πia = α + (( (im + (RRitm  + (i) 
 Regression F  Adj. R2 trtn trisk
TLKM Return = 0.04209 – 40.103R + 1.06π + 0.013664 6.443** 0.609 3.534** -2.752** 
ISAT Return = -0.00715 + 0.903R + 0.186π + 0.011497 0.931 -0.016 1.337 0.143 
GGRM Return = 0.0005464 – 7.117R + 0.215π + 0.006560 2.537 0.339 0.949 -1.430 
ASII Return = 0.02516 – 12.866R – 0.0797π + 0.018258 0.672 -0.058 -0.447 -1.119 
SMGR Return = -0.0250 + 6.663R + 0.06388π + 0.005210 2.998 0.363 0.243 2.393* 
HMSP Return = -0.0119 + 4.590R – 0.163π + 0.011440 0.749 -0.067 -0.841 0.708 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Afternoon Risks 
(Based on formula 2: Rita = α + βπ πim + βRRitm  + εi) 
 Regression F Adj. R2 trtn trisk
TLKM Risk = 0.001473 + 0.127R + 0.007017π + 0.000270 1.932 0.210 1.186 0.441 
ISAT Risk = 0.001388 – 0.04751R + 0.005724π + 0.000305 1.227 0.048 1.554 0.284 
GGRM Risk = 0.0001857 + 0.431R + 0.02331π + 0.000287 3.286 0.433 2.334* 1.966 
ASII Risk = 0.001164 + 0.5R – 0.004522π + 0.000667 0.855 -0.025 0.694 1.191 
SMGR Risk = 0.001506 – 0.150R – 0.03554π + 0.000809 0.480 -0.175 0.870 0.348 
HMSP Risk = 0.002974 – 0.215R – 0.0258π + 0.001043 1.062 0.015 -1.455 -0.364 
Panel C: Dependent Variable: Trading Volume 
(Based on formula 3: Via =  α + βπ πim + βRRitm  + εi) 
 Regression F Adj. R2 trtn trisk
TLKM Volume = 22,161.331 – 857,297R – 282,352.7π + 5,516.92 4.274* 0.483 2.332* -0.146 
ISAT Volume = 8,032.013 – 1,292.050R + 17,799.163π + 
1,212.95 
3.666* 0.372 1.215 -1.943* 
GGRM Volume = 5,148.511 – 136,745R + 29,228.834π + 1,125.45 0.421 -0.239 0.746 -0.159 
ASII Volume = 6,367.404 + 6,899,177R + 37,672.827π + 
3,980.18 
3.976* 0.332 0.969 2.753** 
SMGR Volume = 3,633.871 – 135,217R + 24,798.298π + 1,669.17 0.050 -0.372 0.294 -0.152 
HMSP Volume = 13,612.362 + 960,117.5R + 286,009.9π + 
3,707.13 
10.43** 0.702 4.546*** 0.457 
*** Significant at 1 % 
** Significant at 5 % 
*   Significant at 10 % 
 
Table 6 
Morning Loss and Afternoon Risk-Taking 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Morning Loss  
(Based on formula 1:πia = α + βπ πim + βRRitm  + εi) 
 Regression F  Adj. R2 trtn trisk
TLKM Return = 0.009167 + 1.311R + 0.179π + 0.031630 0.123 -0.19 0.496 0.137 
ISAT Return = 0.003664 – 2.036R – 0.248π + 0.025869 0.172 -0.225 -0.477 -0.337 
GGRM Return = 0.005959 – 1.125R – 0.301π + 0.023566 1.484 0.075 -1.720 -0.218 
ASII Return = -0.0122 – 9.071R – 0.829π + 0.026385 7.701** 0.691 -3.916** -0.745 
SMGR Return = 0.000694 + 0.631R – 0.0223π + 0.020880 1.538 0.089 -0.052 1.650 
HMSP Return = 0.01636 – 8.091R – 0.873π + 0.030389 3.406* 0.325 -2.332** -1.295 
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Panel B: Dependent Variable: Afternoon Risks  
(Based on formula 2: Rita = α + βπ πim + βRRitm  + εi) 
 Regression F  Adj. R2 trtn trisk
TLKM Risk = 0.002104 + 0.04113R + 0.003449π + 0.000615 0.122 -0.190 0.490 0.222 
ISAT Risk = 0.001369 + 0.06441R – 0.00217π + 0.000384 0.295 -0.186 -0.281 0.718 
GGRM Risk = 0.001182 + 0.208R + 0.00002377π + 0.000717 0.907 -0.016 0.004 1.325 
ASII Risk = 0.001709 + 0.406R + 0.002935π + 0.0009625 0.429 -0.235 0.380 0.914 
SMGR Risk = 0.002814 + 0.03653R + 0.001682π + 0.001559 0.977 -0.004 0.053 1.280 
HMSP Risk = 0.0018 + 0.05538R – 0.00262π + 0.000508 0.241 -0.179 -0.419 0.530 
 
Panel C: Dependent Variable: Trading Volume 
(Based on formula 3: Via =  α + βπ πim + βRRitm  + εi) 
 Regression F  Adj. R2 trtn trisk
TLKM Volume = 31,515.339 + 1,217,405R + 135,210.9π + 
14,161.12 
0.348 -0.135 0.834 0.285 
ISAT Volume = 7,164.249 – 725,707R – 21,120.1π + 2,394.14 0.944 -0.013 -0.439 -
1.296 
GGRM Volume = 6,262.085 – 317,461R – 10,102.4π + 2,210.64 0.343 -0.123 -0.616 -
0.657 
ASII Volume = 12,106.192 + 1,907,185R – 166,862π + 
7,632.19 
4.531* 0.541 -2.726* 0.541 
SMGR Volume = 3,278.628 – 7,594.657R + 2,009.102π + 
1,056.29 
0.079 -0.201 0.093 -
0.393 
HMSP Volume = 22,555.573 – 672,314R – 48,209.6π + 7,485.32 0.220 -0.185 -0.523 -
0.437 
** Significant at 5 % 
*   Significant at 10 % 
 
 
Table 7 
Trading Volume and Stock Price Volatility 
 
(Based on formula 4: rit     = α + β Vit  + εit)   
 Regression F  Adj. R2 t 
TLKM Return = 0.000414 + 0.000000000104V + 0.00212 0.269 0.000 0.518 
ISAT Return = 0.0004263 + 0.00000000546V + 0.00196 8.774*** 0.001 2.962*** 
GGRM Return = 0.0005095 + 0.000000003298V + 0.00215 1.014 0.000 1.007 
ASII Return = 0.0005497 + 0.000000001335V + 0.00282 19.44*** 0.001 4.409*** 
SMGR Return = 0.001448 – 0.0000000454 + 0.00552 0.879 0.000 -0.938 
HMSP Return = 0.0005096 + 0.000000001388V + 0.0025 7.464*** 0.001 2.732** 
*** Significant at 1 % 
** Significant at 5 % 
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EXHIBIT 
 
1. TELEKOMUNIKASI INDONESIA 
No Morning Gain 
 Morning Afternoon 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol 
1 0.000000 0.001660 20,250 -0.022222 0.002008 16,288 
2 0.022901 0.001532 23,170 -0.007463 0.002091 28,496 
3 0.007634 0.001255 14,136 0.015267 0.001306 23,614 
4 -0.015504 0.001789 14,049 -0.055556 0.001533 14,958 
5 0.047170 0.002735 33,632 -0.008929 0.001989 36,850 
6 0.017699 0.001510 29,761 -0.008696 0.001719 25,550 
7 0.018692 0.001667 32,322 0.009174 0.001800 33,985 
8 0.051282 0.002164 31,834 0.000000 0.002209 27,597 
 Morning Loss 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol 
1 -0.022059 0.005062 24,580 0.000000 0.002273 31,325 
2 0.007634 0.001696 35,059 0.000000 0.002324 65,742 
3 -0.015038 0.000970 20,692 -0.022901 0.001634 18,363 
4 -0.015873 0.002280 23,748 0.024194 0.001956 17,783 
5 -0.100917 0.002873 25,694 -0.020408 0.001916 29,001 
6 -0.030612 0.001943 30,998 0.084211 0.001880 32,315 
7 0.000000 0.001796 30,282 0.027273 0.002006 37,690 
8 0.000000 0.001862 28,093 0.000000 0.001552 38,556 
9 -0.017699 0.001264 33,359 -0.018018 0.001904 38,109 
10 -0.009259 0.001899 28,531 0.000000 0.002159 29,084 
11 -0.009259 0.001570 20,269 0.018692 0.002137 22,039 
12 -0.009346 0.001504 31,459 0.009434 0.003759 18,195 
 
2. INDOSAT 
No Morning Gain 
 Morning Afternoon 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1 -0.005882 0.001869 5,085 -0.005917 0.001419 4,709 
2 0.005988 0.002985 2,620 0.005952 0.001726 3,393 
3 0.000000 0.001928 2,585 0.006098 0.001458 4,484 
4 -0.006579 0.002311 5,248 -0.019868 0.000916 5,716 
5 0.014388 0.002804 5,418 -0.007092 0.001670 6,147 
6 0.021739 0.001404 6,512 -0.021277 0.001718 7,528 
7 0.021739 0.001114 5,456 0.000000 0.001325 8,552 
8 0.094203 0.001595 7,625 0.013245 0.001885 7,113 
9 0.013245 0.001715 5,572 0.000000 0.002012 5,645 
10 0.013072 0.001193 5,655 0.006410 0.001634 5,649 
 Morning Loss 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1 -0.005882 0.005899 4,669 0.000000 0.001391 2,000 
2 -0.012048 0.001788 3,593 0.000000 0.001401 4,451 
3 -0.030488 0.001099 3,745 -0.012579 0.001235 4,219 
4 -0.025974 0.001702 5,580 -0.006623 0.001281 6,005 
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5 -0.028986 0.003904 4,583 -0.037313 0.002227 5,635 
6 -0.045455 0.002646 5,471 0.055556 0.001910 6,916 
7 -0.014493 0.001989 5,924 0.014706 0.001100 8,180 
8 -0.007092 0.001751 8,399 0.007143 0.001536 10,561 
9 -0.006536 0.002009 6,850 0.000000 0.001699 4,821 
10 0.013072 0.001731 5,251 0.006452 0.001843 4,524 
 
3. GUDANG GARAM 
No Morning Gain 
 Morning Afternoon 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1  0.023810 0.001090 3,726 0.000000 0.000995 4,667 
2 0.011765 0.001694 2,458 0.000000 0.000825 5,252 
3 -0.006098 0.002354 5,429 -0.018519 0.001153 5,630 
4 0.034247 0.002202 4,388 -0.006667 0.001963 6,506 
5 0.013158 0.002175 4,179 -0.019355 0.001577 5,000 
6 0.006579 0.002300 2,422 -0.012987 0.001293 3,727 
7 0.021127 0.000940 3,512 -0.006897 0.001424 6,569 
 Morning Loss 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1 -0.005917 0.005897 4,485 0.000000 0.001783 6,074 
2 -0.011765 0.001854 3,050 -0.005952 0.001424 6,472 
3 0.000000 0.000935 3,122 0.000000 0.001246 5,116 
4 -0.006024 0.000945 7,540 0.000000 0.000000 11,731 
5 -0.006135 0.001989 4,871 0.000000 0.001359 5,375 
6 -0.033557 0.003901 6,416 -0.013889 0.001946 5,536 
7 -0.077465 0.002624 5,005 0.083333 0.002453 5,062 
8 -0.006757 0.002086 3,845 0.013514 0.002118 3,968 
9 -0.019737 0.001765 5,227 -0.013423 0.001688 4,519 
10 0.000000 0.001497 4,766 0.000000 0.002150 5,072 
11 -0.034247 0.001518 4,522 0.007092 0.000877 6,605 
12 0.014388 0.002478 3,885 0.000000 0.002761 3,000 
13 0.100839 0.001638 4,240 0.000000 0.001617 4,504 
 
4. ASTRA INTERNATIONAL 
No Morning Gain 
 Morning Afternoon 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1 -0.009346 0.002137 17,879 -0.018868 0.001950 23,625 
2 0.019417 0.001652 13,500 0.000000 0.002671 14,115 
3 0.012048 0.002754 30,177 0.000000 0.002786 32,893 
4 -0.011494 0.002379 20,516 -0.023256 0.002406 18,153 
5 0.014493 0.003468 35,307 -0.042254 0.003050 29,918 
6 0.000000 0.002721 25,627 0.014706 0.003972 25,258 
7 0.071429 0.002306 26,993 -0.026667 0.001995 28,043 
8 0.082192 0.002738 31,428 -0.012658 0.003459 24,751 
9 0.026316 0.002422 22,419 -0.012821 0.002085 24,830 
10 -0.012821 0.003226 13,331 -0.012987 0.002639 23,000 
11 0.000000 0.002741 21,946 -0.012987 0.001773 27,951 
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12 0.025974 0.002349 21,435 0.025641 0.002235 22,880 
13 0.000000 0.002667 28,539 0.000000 0.001887 27,123 
 Morning Loss 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1 0.000000 0.001851 14,814 0.009524 0.003192 10,929 
2 -0.058252 0.002408 20,055 0.000000 0.000900 18,180 
3 -0.041667 0.002131 20,319 -0.010870 0.002180 32,563 
4 -0.066667 0.002286 18,040 0.000000 0.002973 34,010 
5 -0.031746 0.004531 32,409 -0.027027 0.003447 27,566 
6 -0.166667 0.003319 41,154 0.114754 0.002927 44,517 
7 -0.037500 0.002731 23,999 -0.012987 0.002976 20,867 
 
5. SEMEN GRESIK 
No Morning Gain 
 Morning Afternoon 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1 0.000000 0.003901 2,500 0.000000 0.003285 2,145 
2 0.000000 0.003897 1,375 0.006993 0.001912 2,915 
3 0.006993 0.002744 2,972 -0.006944 0.002411 3,070 
4 0.006993 0.002643 1,500 0.000000 0.002196 5,750 
5 0.007143 0.003448 3,267 -0.007092 0.001274 5,339 
6 0.000000 0.003276 4,136 -0.007353 0.001209 3,081 
7 0.021898 0.003569 2,550 0.000000 0.003057 2,426 
8 0.000000 0.001836 1,874 -0.014085 0.002040 1,990 
 Morning Loss 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1 0.052980 0.004620 3,031 0.006623 0.064455 1,583 
2 -0.006536 0.002668 2,333 -0.037736 0.008033 3,324 
3 0.006667 0.002910 2,409 0.020270 0.019099 1,250 
4 -0.006667 0.002865 3,353 0.006711 0.004478 4,119 
5 0.047297 0.004738 4,882 0.000000 0.003001 2,500 
6 -0.013158 0.005752 3,056 0.000000 0.022810 2,500 
7 0.000000 0.000000 2,250 0.000000 0.003768 2,212 
8 0.000000 0.004910 5,000 -0.006897 0.006603 2,300 
9 0.021898 0.003066 3,009 -0.014286 0.005299 2,728 
10 -0.007042 0.002875 1,917 0.000000 0.004392 1,000 
11 0.014493 0.002776 3,329 -0.027778 0.002695 5,682 
12 -0.007299 0.001852 3,521 -0.014388 0.002499 2,191 
 
6. H. M. SAMPOERNA 
No Morning Gain 
 Morning Afternoon 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1 -0.007353 0.001735 15,028 -0.007407 0.001617 13,980 
2 0.000000 0.002905 12,982 0.015152 0.001351 17,239 
3 -0.015504 0.002347 6,059 0.000000 0.004615 12,556 
4 0.008621 0.002916 17,529 -0.008547 0.001562 16,522 
5 0.000000 0.002149 11,933 -0.017391 0.003028 20,436 
6 0.008850 0.000868 15,226 -0.008772 0.002088 17,560 
7 0.056604 0.001819 21,853 -0.017857 0.001403 34,056 
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8 0.026786 0.002093 18,391 0.000000 0.002166 21,482 
9 0.008547 0.001721 13,673 0.008475 0.002711 11,248 
 Morning Loss 
 Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. Return Risk Av. Trd. Vol. 
1 0.007463 0.001834 31,591 0.007519 0.002562 21,391 
2 0.007519 0.001162 22,445 0.000000 0.000856 8,125 
3 0.007576 0.002360 9,029 0.000000 0.002505 10,352 
4 -0.015152 0.002856 20,973 0.000000 0.002070 16,808 
5 -0.007813 0.001899 18,023 -0.015385 0.002415 15,651 
6 -0.017857 0.001966 18,445 -0.026087 0.006633 28,552 
7 0.117647 0.002468 28,673 -0.064220 0.001723 14,348 
8 -0.008772 0.001606 32,350 -0.008772 0.002184 27,724 
9 0.009434 0.001887 21,380 -0.061947 0.001745 23,198 
10 0.009434 0.002081 17,937 0.009524 0.002192 11,645 
11 0.009434 0.001551 18,086 -0.009346 0.000868 10,772 
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